Abstract-The derivation of a reliable, subjective measure of awareness that is not contaminated by observers' response bias is a problem that has long occupied researchers. Kunimoto et al. (2001) proposed a measure of awareness (a ) which apparently meets this criterion: a is derived from confidence ratings and is based on the intuition that confidence should reflect awareness. The aim of this paper is to explore the validity of this measure. Some calculations suggested that, contrary to Kunimoto et al.'s intention, a can vary as a result of changes in response bias affecting the relative proportions of high-and low-confidence responses. This was not evident in the results of Kunimoto et al. 's original experiments because their method may have artificially 'clamped' observers' response bias close to zero. A predicted consequence of allowing response bias to vary freely is that it can result in a varying from negative, through zero, to positive values, for a given value of discriminability (d ). We tested whether such variations are likely to occur in practice by employing Kunimoto et al.'s paradigm with various modifications, notably the removal of constraints upon the proportions of low-and high-confidence responses, in a visual discrimination task. As predicted, a varied with response bias in all participants. Similar results were found when a was calculated from pre-existing data obtained from a patient with blindsight: a varied through a range of positive results without approaching zero, which is inconsistent with his well-documented lack of awareness. A second experiment showed how response bias could be manipulated to yield elevated values of a . On the basis of these findings we conclude that Kunimoto's measure is not as impervious to response bias as was originally assumed.
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether or not stimuli can be perceived in the absence of awareness is one that has long intrigued researchers. One of the main obstacles to resolving this question lies in the derivation of a satisfactory measure of awareness. Measures of * To whom correspondence should be addressed. Neurosciences Building, Department of Psychiatry, Warneford Hospital, Oxford, OX3 7YZ, UK. E-mail: simon.evans@psych.ox.ac.uk awareness can be grouped into two categories: subjective and objective. As many authors have pointed out (e.g. Bisiach, 1986) , subjective measures of awareness are the most intuitively appealing, since phenomenal experience is intrinsic to the concept of awareness. Most early work on awareness employed a subjective measure: subjects were asked to judge their level of awareness of a visual or tactile stimulus, either directly or through the use of confidence ratings (e.g. Peirce and Jastrow, 1884; Sidis, 1898). These studies tended to show that subjects, despite claiming little or no awareness, were able to identify the target at above-chance performance. This led researchers to conclude that perception can exist in the absence of awareness.
Unfortunately, all work based on a subjective measure of awareness is potentially confounded by response bias, so that, despite subjects' claims to the contrary, one cannot be certain that they were not in fact partially or fully aware of the stimulus. In line with this, Bjorkman et al. (1993) provide evidence that subjects are systematically under-confident in sensory discrimination tasks. Hence the problem lies in objectively determining a given subject's internal criterion for differentiating 'aware' from 'unaware'. However, it seems unlikely that any objective methodology will ever be deemed satisfactory, essentially because no objective measure can adequately capture the subjective qualities intrinsic to the notion of awareness (see Merikle and Reingold, 1998) .
Recently, Kunimoto et al. (2001) devised a procedure which appeared to overcome the difficulties outlined above. It involved asking observers to rate their confidence in their discriminatory responses, and then deriving a bias-free measure of awareness from the data using a calculation inspired by signal detection theory (SDT), intended to capture the intuition that reported confidence should reflect awareness (Peirce and Jastrow, 1884).
SDT provides a measure of an observer's ability to discriminate a stimulus independently of response bias (Green and Swets, 1966) . It assumes that presence and absence of a stimulus is associated with different but overlapping distributions of underlying neural signals, and that a discrimination involves a threshold criterion which differentiates a 'target presented' decision from a 'blank presented' decision. As the two distributions overlap to some extent, the use of a particular decision criterion is bound to lead to errors, namely false alarms (responding positively when no target is present) and misses (responding negatively when the target is present), as well as correct responses -hits (a positive response when the target is present) or correct rejections (a negative response when no target is present). This is represented in Table 1 . Assuming that the distributions are normal and of equal variance, the discriminability of the stimulus (d , also referred to as the sensitivity of the observer to the stimulus), which is equivalent to the difference between the means of the two distributions expressed in standard deviations, can be calculated as follows
